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Gathering Moss: The NLRA's
Resistance to Legislative Change
James J. Brudney*
Introduction
It has become commonplace to refer to the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA)1 as ossified.2 To be sure, Congress does not typically revisit
on a frequent basis statutes that are transformative of the surrounding
legal landscape. Still, compare the national law of labor-management
relations to major statutes governing telecommunications, securities,
banking, civil rights, education, health care, or the environment. In
stark contrast to these other regulatory schemes, Congress has made
virtually no changes in the NLRA since Jackie Robinson integrated
major league baseball, since television arrived in American homes, or
since well before the creation of the interstate highway system.
Why has the NLRA been so intensely resistant to change for over
six decades? How was Congress able to enact two major laws within a
twelve-year period but then unable to approve proposed reforms in the
years since 1947? In an effort to identify salient factors that contributed to congressional action and inaction, I reviewed contemporaneous
accounts from major newspapers that described and analyzed two key
legislative "successes" in 1935 and 1947 and also two more recent congressional "failures" in 1978 and 1992.3
This article focuses on stories and columns appearing in the
months preceding several crucial legislative events: House and Senate

*Newton D. Baker-Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law, The Ohio State University
Moritz College of Law; formerly Minority Counsel, then Chief Counsel and Staff Director,
U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Labor, 1985 to 1992. I am grateful to Jim Pope and Fred
Feinstein for insightful comments on an earlier draft, and to Melanie Luthern, Katherine
Hall, and Karin Johnsrud for valuable research assistance. Jennifer Pursell furnished
able secretarial support. The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law provided generous financial assistance.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006).
2. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, The OssificationofAmerican Labor Law, 102 COLUM.
1527 (2002); Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment:Reflections on the
Aging of the NationalLabor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. Emp. & LAs. L. 569 (2007).

L.

REV.

3. Given prescribed space limits, not all reform efforts are discussed: I have omitted the successful 1974 amendments extending NLRA coverage to employees of nonprofit
hospitals and the failed 1996 effort to amend section 8(a)(2) of the Act. In addition, my
operative definition of "success" is based on congressional enactment rather than ideological valence, although in contemplating future legislative reform, I focus on change
that would facilitate union recognition and collective bargaining. In that regard, I briefly
address the status of the proposed Employee Free Choice Act in Part II.
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approval of the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts and Senate filibuster
votes that signaled the demise of the 1978 Labor Law Reform Act and
the 1992 Workplace Fairness Act.4 The newspaper accounts are in one
sense simply a snapshot; they cannot substitute for the depth and
perspective available from historical and other scholarly analyses. At
the same time, quantity and quality of press coverage tend to reflect
the urgency associated with reform efforts during Congress's critical
review period. Moreover, while newspaper owners as employers may
be presumed to oppose pro-union changes in the NLRA, the tone and
content of coverage are not invariably unfavorable to organized labor's
position.' In any event, news stories, opinion columns, and editorials
capture how issues and arguments were framed and understood at the
time key legislative decisions were made, thereby shedding light on
factors that influenced Congress either to approve or decline a major
law reform effort.
In examining the four legislative campaigns, I borrow from political scientist John Kingdon's view of Congress as a form of organized
anarchy.' Kingdon's model of lawmaking, as dynamic and discontinuous yet also coherent, largely comports with my own experience while
serving for over seven years as a committee counsel in the U.S. Senate.
Kingdon posits a recurring interplay among three separately developing process streams: problems that capture the attention of the policy
community working in and around Congress; proposals generated and
refined as potential solutions to the problems; and political climate
that allows for or discourages openings in the legislative process to
enact the possible solutions.'
All four legislative campaigns featured potentially enactable proposals that were concrete, feasible, and sufficiently refined by policy
participants so that they might have ripened into statutory solutions.
What separates successes from failures, however, are the magnitude
4. For the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts, I examined reports and columns appearing in the New York Times, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, PittsburghPost-Gazette,
Cleveland Plain Dealer, St. Louis Post-Dispatch,and Los Angeles Times. For the Labor
Law Reform and Workplace Fairness Acts, I focused on the New York, Washington, and
Chicago newspapers, and in addition reviewed stories from the Wall Street Journal, US.
News & World Report, and several smaller local papers. I am grateful to Melanie Luthern, Moritz College of Law Class of 2012, for her exceptionally diligent and thoughtful
research into these newspapers.
5. See Part I.A, infra, discussing favorable coverage of Wagner-Connery Act. More
generally, the Court has upheld journalists' right to organize under the NLRA (see Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937)), and journalists at many major newspapers
are covered by collective bargaining agreements.
6. JoHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 84-89 (2d. ed.

1995).
7. See id. For more extended discussion of Kingdon's approach, see James J.Brudney, CongressionalCommentary on JudicialInterpretationsof Statutes: Idle Chatteror
Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1, 24-26 (1994).
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and resonance of the perceived policy problems and also certain distinctive aspects of the political environment before and during floor
consideration.
The problems identified in 1935 and 1947, manifested through a
series of strikes and confrontations, commanded exceptionally broad
and intense attention from the public at large as well as the labormanagement policy community. This attentiveness and sense of immediacy were the essential predicates for legislative success; in both
1935 and 1947, bills moved through the House and Senate in virtual
lockstep over a period of less than two months. Further, the political climate in these two instances featured unusual extrinsic circumstances
that generated vital momentum for each bill's congressional supporters. In 1935, a pivotal factor was two Supreme Court decisions, invalidating the Railway Pension Act and the National Industrial Recovery
Act, that came down during Senate and House floor consideration of
the NLRA. In 1947, an important development was the fear of spreading communism at the dawn of the Cold War era.
By contrast, the bills defeated in 1978 and 1992 involved far less
public awareness of or investment in the policy problems identified by
members of Congress and their staffs. Whether due to a lack of dramatic and disruptive tactics or to the absence of a compelling substantive message, the proposed reforms never generated sufficient urgency
with key policymakers or the public at large. Relatedly, House passage
in these cases was followed by a delay of eight to eleven months before
the Senate turned to floor consideration. This prolonged period may
well have aided bill opponents at a time when recently revised Senate
rules on filibusters were becoming a serious obstacle to enactment of
majority-favored legislation.
Part I relies primarily on newspaper accounts to describe key factors
contributing to legislative successes and failures in the labor-management
relations area. Part II discusses possible lessons for the future.
I.
A.

Legislative Successes and Failures
The 1935 Wagner-ConneryAct'
The bills that became the NLRA moved from committee report to
presidential signature in a two-month period between early May and
early July 1935.9 During 1934 and early 1935, the country had been

8. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.

§§ 151-69).
9. See U.S. HOUSE

OF REPS., CALENDARS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTA245 (1936) (recounting bill reported by Senate Committee May 2, 1935; passed Senate May 16; reported by House
Committee May 21 and June 10; passed House June 19; conference report agreed to by

TIVES AND HISTORY OF LEGISLATION 74TH CONG. (FINAL ED.)

both Houses June 27; signed by President July 5).
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gripped by strike activity that stemmed primarily from workers' efforts
to secure union recognition and collective bargaining.10 Organized labor
and its supporters in Congress had warned that workers' patience in
pursuit of these basic protections was running out." Reports of strike
activity across the country accompanied the decisive stages of the legislation, creating a heightened sense of urgency for congressional action.
By May 1935, news articles reflected the growing prospect of a
national labor emergency. 12 A major strike idled 4,000 shipbuilding
workers in New Jersey immediately before the Senate floor vote on
May 16, delaying $50 million worth of production." Days prior to the
House floor vote in June, a strike date was announced for some 400,000
coal miners.14 A Washington Post article at the end of May addressed
a litany of current or imminent work stoppages-by longshoremen on
the Pacific Coast, lumber workers in the Northwest, steelworkers in
Ohio, and textile workers in the Southeast.15
Strike activity and related violent clashes appeared to intensify
in June 1935, following the Supreme Court decision in Schechter Poultry.1 Prior to the Court's decision, labor and its supporters viewed the
National Industrial Recovery Act as inadequate, due mainly to failed
enforcement of the law's collective bargaining provision and the Act's
toleration, if not encouragement, of company unions." But the Court's

10. See IndustrialLabor Disputes, 41 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 655, 655 (1935) (reporting
between 121 and 326 strikes in progress during every month from January 1934 through
July 1935, with 1.2 million workdays lost due to 281 strikes in progress during April
1935); id. at 657-58 (describing strike begun in May 1935 by 32,000 lumber workers in
Oregon and Washington seeking union recognition); id. at 665 (reporting that in 47% of
the 153 strikes and lockouts begun in May 1935, matters related to union organization
were the major issues); IndustrialDisputes, 41 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 83, 91 (1935) (reporting that in 60% of the 135 strikes and lockouts begun in March 1935, matters related to
union organization were the major issues).
11. See, e.g., Louis Stark, Green Says Labor Is Losing Patience,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,
1935, at 7; Stuart Chase, New Hope of Labor Seen in Strike Wave, WASH. PosT, July 22,
1934, at B5; David I. Walsh, To Combat the Strike Crisis,Walsh Urges the Wagner Bill,
N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1934, at XX2.
12. See, e.g., Louis Stark, Coal Strike Looms While Textile Leader Urges Defiance
of Wage Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1935, at 12; Franklyn Waltman Jr., Appalachian Pay
Parley Fails;President Green and Lewis Confer, WASH. POST, May 29, 1935, at 1.
13. Strike Bars Work on $50,000,000 Ships, N.Y. TIMEs, May 14, 1935, at 41.
14. Stark, supra note 12.
15. See Strike Threat on Coast Adds to NRA Crisis,WASH. PosT, May 31, 1935, at 4.
16. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (decided May 27,
1935).
17. See Louis Stark, New Chapter Opening in History of Unions, N.Y. TIMES,
May 19, 1935, at E7 (discussing failed enforcement); 6000 Join ProtestAgainst the NRA,
N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1935, at 2 (discussing inadequate enforcement); Organized Labor Is
Put at 6,700,000, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 1935, at E12 (reporting that nearly forty percent of
organized workers were under company union plans as of February 1935); Industrial
Disputes, 41 MornmY LAB. REV. 1277, 1286 (1935) (discussing labor strike in textile mill
employing 1,200 workers that was divided between company union and independent
trade union).
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invalidation of the Act on May 27 unleashed a new wave of strikes
and protests. Unions and workers feared that companies would take
advantage of the law's removal to reduce wages and living standards in
already-desperate times. 8
On June 7, 1935, American Federation of Labor (AFL) President
William Green delivered a national radio speech that was reported in
full the next day by the New York Times.19 He emphasized that, with the
invalidation of the industrial codes of fair practice, "working people will
be compelled to fight, as never before, for the exercise of their right to
organize into independent trade unions of their own choosing" and that
the Wagner-Connery bill was vital to the attainment of this right.2 0
Throughout June 1935, newspapers across the country reported
on a breathtaking array of violent strikes and demonstrations. Several days of riots during a streetcar workers' strike in Omaha ended
with the governor declaring martial law.2 1 Troops used tear gas during violent picketing by lumber workers in Tacoma that threatened to
turn into a general strike.2 2 A steelworkers' strike in Canton involved
tear gas, shotguns, and casualties," while city power lines were cut
during a major electrical workers' strike in Toledo.24 Even Ohio State
University students battled police during a strike at a packing plant

in Columbus.25
The scope and intensity of worker protests continued into late
June, as the House approved the bill on June 19 and both houses
agreed to the conference report on June 27. Many newspaper stories in
this period simply reported seriatim on strikes from around the country.26 While the reporters did not condone strike-related violence, they

18. See, e.g., 15,000 March in NY Threat to "Chiselers,"WASH. POST, June 9, 1935,
at 7; Green CallsAids in NRA Emergency, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, June 3, 1935, at 9; Ghads
0. Skinner, Gas Fogs Issues in Canton Strike, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, June 2, 1935, at 8A;
Strike Threat on Coast, supra note 15.
19. See Text of Green's Address Urging Amendment to Curb Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 1935, at 8.
20. Id.
21. See Martial Law in Omaha Ends Violence After Three Nights of Strike Riots,
ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, June 16, 1935, at 1; MartialLaw and Troops Rule Omaha, CLEV.
PLAIN DEALER, June 16, 1935, at 1.
22. See General Strike Threat, Troops Use Gas, Clubs, CHI. TRIB., June 25, 1935, at
11; Troops, Tear Gas End Strike Riot, N.Y TIMES, June 25, 1935, at 3.
23. See Skinner, supra note 18.
24. See Another Strike Begins in Toledo Power Plants, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH,
June 14, 1935, at 4B; Hopes for Peace Grow at Toledo, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, June 16, 1935,
at 10A.
25. See Airs O.S.U Students'Partin Strike Clash,CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, June 1, 1935,
at 2.
26. See, e.g., General Strike Threat, supra note 22 (reporting major strikes in Tacoma, Cleveland, and Providence); Strike Gunfire Takes Two Lives at Textile Mill, CHI.
TaI., June 20, 1935, at 3 (reporting on major strike activity in South Carolina, Wisconsin, and Nebraska).
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at times appeared to sympathize with striking workers and bystanders

who endured tear gas barrages or shotgun fire from company personnel and National Guardsmen. 27 One reporter, recounting the fear experienced by picketers, observed: "You forget the equities of the situation
and wonder what kind of persons they are who can fire gas projectiles
and toss tear grenades with such uncanny precision." 28
These accounts of workers risking their jobs, their health, and
even their lives to secure rights to organize and bargain collectively
seemed to frame the magnitude of the policy issues at stake during the
last weeks of congressional deliberations. The timing of the Supreme
Court decision, removing any prospect that the Industrial Recovery Act
could deliver employee protections, galvanized organized labor for its
final push toward enactment. In addition, the Court's skeptical constitutional stance had a quirkier positive effect on the political climate, by
tacitly inviting Republican legislators and business leaders to give the
proposed law a free pass.
The Senate approved the Wagner bill with "unexpected speed" 29
twelve days before SchechterPoultry was announced. A New York Times
story reported the "change from determined, delaying opposition to the
mere making of a record against the proposals" following a Court decision in early May that had invalidated the Railway Pension Act.30 The
story went on to summarize this "new Republican attitude" as follows:
"If there is a good chance of knocking out all these things in the courts,
and they are going to be put through anyhow, it is a wise policy to put
no particular legislative obstacles in their path."3'
Right after the Court decided Schechter Poultry, the Washington
Post described the Wagner-Connery measure as "heading into the validity maelstrom."32 An article in the PittsburghPost-Gazettesuggested
that some legislators voted for the bill knowing it did not meet the
Court's constitutional test.33 In July, the Democratic Senate leader
wryly observed that a speech by the Republican National Committee

27. See generally Skinner, supranote 18; Troops, Tear Gas, supra note 22.

28. Skinner, supra note 18.
29. Wagner Labor Bill Passed by Senate by Vote of 63 to 12, N.Y. TIMES, May 17,

1935, at 1.

30. Arthur Krock, Sudden Senate Spurt Speeds Adjournment, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,
1935, at E3. The decision, RailroadRetirement Board v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330

(1935), had been issued May 6.
31. Krock, supra note 30.
at 4.

32. See Leaders Give Up Plan to Finish Session Soon, WASH. PosT, May 31, 1935,

33. See David Lawrence, Today in Washington: Passage of UnconstitutionalActs
Likely to Be in Next Year's Election, PITTSBURGH PosT-GAZETTE, June 13, 1935, at 23; see also
David Lawrence, Today in Washington:CongressIntends to GoAhead PassingLaws Which
Are Claimed to Be Unconstitutional,PrrrSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, June 25, 1935, at 19.
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chairman challenging the Wagner Act's constitutionality was in effect
criticizing leading Republican senators who had voted for final passage. 4 In sum, the Republican Party, along with top business leaders,
evidently concluded that a bruising floor fight was unnecessary because
the Wagner Act would fail under the Court's constitutional test."5
The 1947 Taft-Hartley Act 36
The bills that became the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA)3 1 traveled from initial committee report to veto override between mid April and late June 1947.38 The backdrop once again involved a prolonged period of intense strike activity beginning in early
1946, just a few months after victory was declared over Japan. But
whereas the strikes in 1934 and 1935 had focused primarily on demands for union recognition and efforts to resist employer cutbacks,
the strikes in 1946 were mainly about wage increases for those who
had union contracts. With the post-war rise in prices, millions of workers expressed frustration over the decline in their real income. Strikes
during 1946 set a record for lost worktime, and the resultant disruptions to vital services generated hostile reactions from large portions
of the public.39
Press coverage of the Wagner-era strikes had reported on the violence but also had addressed the labor movement's substantive demands and priorities. By contrast, press coverage of Taft-Hartley-era
strikes focused more heavily on adverse consequences to the public.
During May and June 1947, newspaper stories were regularly critical
of union-initiated strikes that undermined economic growth and frustrated Americans in their daily lives.

B.

34. See Robinson in Reply Gibes at Fletcher,N.Y. TIMEs, July 31, 1935, at 10. Twelve
Republican senators had voted for final passage. See The Wagner Bill Votes, N.Y. TImEs,
May 17, 1935, at 4.
35. For the business community position, see, for example, Business Men Hold
Wagner Bills Faulty,N.Y TIMES, July 18, 1935, at 31. See generally IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE
NEw DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY 120-23 (1950); PETER H. IRONS, THE NEw DEAL
LAwYERs 231 (1982).

36. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
37. Id.

38. See U.S. HOUSE OF REPS., CALENDARS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND HISTORY OF LEGISLATION (FINAL ED.) 80TH CONG. 139 (1948) (recounting LMRA reported by House committee April 12, 1947; passed House April 17; passed Senate May 13;
conference report agreed to by House June 4, and by Senate June 6; vetoed by President
June 20; veto overridden by House June 20 and by Senate June 23).
39. See Work Stoppages Caused by Labor-Management Disputes in 1946, 64
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 780, 780-81 (1947) (reporting 4.6 million workers were involved in
work stoppages in 1946, a larger number than in any previous year; 116 million workdays were lost). See generally DAviD L. STEBENNE, ARTHUR J.GOLDBERG: NEw DEAL LIBERAL
58 (1996); A.H. Raskin, Elysium Lost: The Wagner Act at Fifty, 38 STAN. L. REV. 945,949
(1986). These strikes also mobilized voters to support anti-labor candidates; the 1946
elections yielded Republican majorities in both houses for the first time since 1930.
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A number of articles addressed the negative impact of strikes
on the nation's economic health even as that health was noticeably
improving. A Los Angeles Times front-page article reported on record
employment growth as well as increases in personal income and consumption of goods but added that "fear-generated by confused politics, works stoppages and the excessive demands of labor-may topple
the future into a recession through hysteria."40 The New York Times
reported that lost strike days had peaked in April 1947,1 adding in a
separate story that although industrial profits were robust, "[h] ad not
a third of the [1946] production been lost by a record number of strikes,
the year's earnings would have surpassed all records." 42 Additional articles discussed the adverse effects of strikes and labor union conflicts
on particular industries such as building construction in New York and
film production in Los Angeles. 43
Many articles also described the disruption and hardship experienced by the American public from strikes and related labor protests.
A strike by telephone service workers was reported to have reduced
nationwide long-distance phone service by eighty percent and deprived
six million subscribers of some or all services." Other strikes deprived
the public of bus services, threatened to curtail urban food supplies,
halted rail freight shipments, and scaled back the creation of movies.4 5
One emotionally charged story described how a minister and his brothers braved threats from union picketers to dig their own mother's grave
at a strike-ridden cemetery.46
Press coverage in the late spring of 1947 reflected a perception of
unions as having substantially overreached; this in turn helped frame
the importance of policy changes that would restrict unions' statutory
authority and their economic power. Organized labor's legislative strategy may have contributed to the momentum for reform. A New York

40. Prosperity Seen Periled by Unions, L.A. TIMES, June 12, 1947, at Al.
41. See Strike Time Lost in April at Peak Since May, 1946, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1947,

at 15.
42. C.M. Reckert, IndustrialProfit at Record Level, N.Y TIMES, May 25, 1947, at Fl.
43. See Building Hit Hard by Cement Strike, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1947, at 2; Hollywood Labor Squabbles Drive Films Elsewhere, L.A. TIMES, June 21, 1947, at A4.
44. See Sam Stavisky, Long Lines Are Crippledby Walkout of 300,000, WASH. POST,

Apr. 8, 1947, at 1.
45. See 100,000 Bus Riders Hit by Strikes, L.A. TIMES, June 7, 1947, at 1; Warehouse
Strike May Cut City Food,N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1947, at 21; RailroadShipments Halted to
Strikebound US. Ports,L.A. TIMES, June 18, 1947, at 1; Unions Peril Us, Film Man Says,
L.A. TIMES, June 19, 1947, at 1; see also Johnson Kanady, 1946 Bus 7ye-Up Called Proofof

Need for Curbs, CHI. TRIB., May 25, 1947, at 12 (describing how agriculture suffers from
strikes because machines wear out and farmers "can't even get baling wire to fix the old
ones up").
46. See 3 Men Dig Mother's Grave in Strike-Bound Cemetery, WASH. PosT, May 28,

1947, at 5.
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Tines article reported that by resisting all proposed adjustments and
offering no proposals of their own, union leaders and their principal
congressional spokesmen had become isolated in the face of public de-

mands for change. 47

One additional factor that intensified the political climate favoring enactment of Taft-Hartley was growing national concern about the
spread of communism and the labor movement's possible role in this
development. During May and June 1947, there was heavy coverage
of the threat posed by communist expansion abroad and infiltration
at home. The Cold War had begun, and newspapers across the country reported on communism's movement across Europe as well as the
continuing size of Soviet military forces.48 The press also focused on
the possible influence exerted by communist organizations and sympathizers in the United States, often reporting on charges made by the
House Un-American Activities Committee. 49 In an April 1947 opinion
poll, sixty-one percent responded that membership in the Communist
Party should be prohibited by law.50
Numerous newspaper reports identified unions as an alleged refuge for communists and fellow travelers.5 1 One prominently featured
story in the weeks preceding Taft-Hartley enactment involved allegations that the Communist Party had directed a union to engage in a
major strike in 1941 at an Allis-Chalmers plant in Milwaukee. A House
labor subcommittee concluded that the CIO-UAW local union president had been "a tool of the Communist party," and that the strike was
called because the plant was doing important work for the Navy at a
time when Soviet Russia had a nonaggression pact with Germany.52

47. See Arthur Krock, In the Nation: Labor Leaders Offer a Blank Page as Alternative, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1947, at 22.
48. See, e.g., Jack Guinn, "Hungary Lost to West," Reds in Full Control, Official
Says, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, June 1, 1947, at Al; Reds Reported Demanding Complete
Control over Government in Austria, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, June 8, 1947, at Al; C. L.
Sulzberger, Communists Widen Control in Russia,N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1947, at 12; William
Fulton, Soviet Retains 4,350,000 UnderArms for Peace, CHI. TRIB., May 15, 1947, at 3.
49. See, e.g., Thomas Asserts He Finds Pro-Reds in Atomic Plants, ST. Louis PosTDISPATCH, June 5, 1947, at 18C; Joseph A. Loftus, House Body Calls Southern Group Communist Front, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1947, at 1; John Evans, US. Reds Few but Effective,
Sheen Asserts, CHI. TRIB., May 31, 1947, at 6.

50. See 11 Pus. OPINION Q. 277, 281 (1947).
51. See, e.g., Loftus, supra note 49 (reporting on alleged Communist sympathies of
a United Mine Workers district president and attorney); Evans, supra note 49 (reporting assertion that the Communist Party has "many front organizations" in this country,
including some labor unions).
52. See Brands Allis Strike Chiefs Tools ofReds, Cm. TRIB., June 1, 1947, at 1; John
D. Morris, Communist Party Blamed for Strike atAllis in 1941, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1947,

at 1. For a contrary analysis, maintaining that the "communist-directed" allegations were
a smokescreen for the underlying issue of opposition to unionism in defense industries,
see Yu Takeda, The Allis-Chalmers Strike in 1941 and the Issue of Communism (June 25,

1982) (on file with Osaka Kyoiku University) (copy also available from author).
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The subcommittee went on to assert that "the Communist influence at
Allis-Chalmers during the past ten years has created friction between
this employer and its employees" and stated that no employer should
be required to bargain collectively with a union representative who
either is a Communist Party member or reasonably can be regarded
as affiliated with the party.53 The LMRA included a provision barring
unions from receiving National Labor Relations Board certification or
assistance until its officers filed affidavits stating they were not communists or communist sympathizers. 54
Newspapers in June 1947 captured the views of individual citizens,
columnists, and editorial writers that "[tihe Communists in labor unions
are too numerous,"5 that "[t]heir foothold in the labor movement is the
most valued Communist asset,"5 6 and that "union bosses [stand] elbow to
elbow with the Communists in the assault [on the Act]."." The national
anxiety about communism and its alleged strength within the union
movement during the spring of 1947 was probably not a decisive factor
given Congress's overwhelming support for Taft-Hartley. Still, the public
and congressional focus on communist threats further undermined the
image and political influence of unions as the LMRA was considered.
C. Failure of Legislative Reform Efforts in 1978 and 1992
At one level, it may seem harsh to label these two efforts failures. In
both cases, bills passed the House and enjoyed majority support in the
Senate, but proponents could not garner enough votes to end Senate filibusters. In the legislative arena, however, "almost" has a hollow ring. And
in these two instances, newspaper coverage offers some insight into key
shortcomings that resulted in an inability to secure Senate passage.
1. The 1978 Labor Law Reform Act"
The Labor Law Reform bill sought to alter NLRA procedures and
remedies aimed at existing violators; it did not address substantive
definitions of legal or illegal conduct. The bill's objectives were speedier
union representation elections, greater union access during organizing campaigns, and stronger monetary relief for illegally fired workers.
The House passed its version in October 1977, but the Senate bill failed
to surmount a filibuster in June 1978.6'
53. See Morris,supra note 52.
54. See Most ImportantProvisionsof Taft-HartleyAct, Cm. TaRm., June 24, 1947, at

1 (item no. 11).
55. Magnus Bjorndal, Letter to Editor, Communists and Unions, N.Y. TWmEs, June 2,
1947, at 24.
56. Joseph Alsop & Stewart Alsop, Matter of Fact: Labor Bill Veto?, WASH. POST,

June 2, 1947, at 9.
57. Editorial, Senate Is Crux of Union Bill Fight,L.A. TIMES, June 18, 1947, at A4.

58. S. 2467, 95th Cong. (1978).
59. See CONG. RESEARCH SERv., DIGEST OF PUBLIc GENERAL BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS,
95TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION, FINAL ISSUE, PART 1, at 501-02 (1979) (recounting the passage
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Press coverage in the weeks preceding the Senate floor fight focused more on the struggle between labor and business interest groups
than on the underlying policy problem of significantly increased unlawful activity by employers during the 1970s. One editorial opined
that "[b] oth unions and employers have loaded this bill with symbolic
freight far out of proportion to anything that it will accomplish." 60
Other articles emphasized that "[sleldom has the Capitol seen such
a variety of pressure tactics from lobbyists" 61 and predicted that
"[riesults of the impending confrontation ... are expected to deal the
loser a major setback in credibility and influence on Capitol Hill for
years to come."62 Consistent with this theme, a Washington Post story
featured a pivotal undecided senator who expressed concern about
the deluge of "grass-roots" efforts directed at him; he worried that the
heavy volume of cards, letters, phone calls, and telegrams could shut
down his daily office operations. 63 A single pro-business organization
estimated it had sent out 12 million pieces of mail-and that was more
than two weeks before the first Senate cloture vote in mid-June."6
A major story line in contemporaneous accounts was the unprecedented mobilization of diverse business interests into a united political front on labor issues. Notably, large unionized firms that had long
adjusted to the NLRA joined the antiunion coalition.6 1 Corporate political action committees and "grassroots" campaigns involving local
businesses had proliferated starting in the mid 1970s. 66 The defeat
of organized labor's principal congressional objective was viewed as a
vindication of these new techniques, evidence that "the business community has developed an effective lobbying capacity exceeding any influence it has exercised in Washington in the past."67
of the bill in the House on Oct. 6, 1977; the failure of four cloture motions in the Senate from
June 13-22, 1978; and the closest votes being 58-41 on June 14 and 58-39 on June 15).
60. The Labor Bill, WASH. PosT, May 19, 1978, at A18.
61. The Battle Heats Up over a New Labor Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 5,

1978, at 89.
62. James Strong, Foes Girdfor Labor Law Fight, CHI. TRIB., May 3, 1978, at C9; see
also A.H. Raskin, Behind Labor Law Fight, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, June 13, 1978, at 21A

("[Tihe fierce emotionalism underlying the polarized positions taken ... makes it plain
that the vote's significance transcends the specific legislation.").
63. See Helen Dewar, "Grass-Roots"Lobbying in Full Flower,WASH. PosT, May 28,

1978, at A2.
64. See id.
65. See Hard Times for Labor,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 10, 1978, at 23 (report-

ing labor leaders' concern that the Business Roundtable was joining with other business
groups in an attempt to "crush labor's pet bills"); see also Patrick Akard, CorporateMobilization and PoliticalPower: The Transformation of US. Economic Policy in the 1970s, 57

AM. Soc. REv. 597, 605 (1992) (discussing the importance of the decision by the Business
Roundtable to join the anti-reform coalition).
66. See Akard, supra note 65, at 602; Dewar, supra note 63.
67. Philip Shabecoff, Momentum Is Seen Shifting to Labor Bill Opponents, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 18, 1978, at 35.
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Conversely, coverage of the 1978 Senate floor fight also referred
to the waning influence of the labor movement in Washington.68 President Jimmy Carter and Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall decried the
6 9 But apart
"grossly distorted" lobbying effort against the bill itself.
from describing allegations that the proposal's relatively moderate provisions were being mischaracterized, the press reported frequently on
the image problems of unions. Stories and columns routinely referred to
the labor movement as "big labor" and to its leaders as "union bosses," 0
even as Secretary Marshall responded that this type of commentary
centered on the "mythical enemy of the working man-union bosses."n
In addition, numerous stories during these weeks discussed both the
union movement's role in fostering inflation and union leaders' ties
to organized crime. 72 Labor leaders acknowledged that the old clich6s
about union officials as power brokers or hoodlums were hurting them
when they sought congressional action on behalf of workers.73
The print media's seeming passion to frame a gladiatorial battle
between business and labor, rather than devote attention to the underlying policy issues, may reflect in part the evolving priorities of their
audience. In the aftermath of Watergate, lobbyists, interest groups,
and the role of money on Capitol Hill became more important and intriguing to readers. Ultimately, however, labor's inability to generate
sufficient public recognition and concern about the burgeoning antiunion lawlessness among employers severely damaged its legislative
reform effort. As one Senate supporter reportedly observed at the time,
"[m]any conservatives 'smell blood in the water'"; these opponents

viewed the labor-reform measure "as a convenient vehicle to discredit
labor's validity as a major social institution." 4
One additional factor influencing Senate timing and perhaps outcome was consideration of the Panama Canal Treaties of 1977. Fol68. See, e.g., id.; FilibusterDefeats Union OrganizingBill, CHI. TRIB., June 23, 1978,
at 1.
69. See CarterRips "Distorted"Opposition to Labor Bill, CHI. TRIB., May 10, 1978,
at B2.
70. See, e.g., FilibusterDefeats Union Organizing Bill, supra note 68; Arch Puddington, Reforming Labor Law, N.Y. TIMEs, June 14, 1978, at A25.

71. See Jeffrey St. John, On Labor-Law Reform, N.Y TIMEs, May 18, 1978, at A23
(quoting Secretary Marshall).
72. On unions and inflation, see, for example, Helen Dewar, MarshallProds Business and Labor over Inflation, WASH. PosT, June 14, 1978, at A6; Michael C. Jensen, Inflation and the Small Businessman, N.Y TIMES, June 11, 1978, at F2; Hobart Rowen, Unions
as Stumbling Block in the Inflation Fight,WASH. POST, June 22, 1978, at A27. On unions
and organized crime, see, for example, OrganizedCrime:How Big a Role in Unions?,U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., May 8, 1978, at 83; Arthur Siddon, FBI InfiltratesMafia, CHI. TRIB.,
May 7, 1978, at 1; Walter H. Waggoner, Ex-TeamsterAide from ParamusPleads Guilty on

Illegal Payments, N.Y TIMES, June 9, 1978, at 17.
73. See Hard Times for Labor,supra note 65.
74. See Puddington, supra note 70 (quoting Senator Jacob Javits on "blood in the
water").
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lowing months of heated debate, the Senate narrowly ratified the two
treaties in March and April 1978.75 A number of moderate Republicans
and conservative Democrats were key supporters of ratification, and
there was heavy criticism from conservatives for this treaty support. 76
Two months later, target votes to secure cloture for labor law reform
included many of these same senators, who were understandably reluctant to "walk the plank" twice in such a short period. Instead, some
senators may well have used opposition to labor law reform to try to
resurrect their standing in conservative circles. 7
2. The 1992 Workplace FairnessAct"
Unlike the procedural focus of the 1978 reform measure, the 1992
Workplace Fairness bill was straightforwardly substantive. The bill's
objective was to expand the definition of illegal employer conduct by
prohibiting the use of permanent replacements for economic strikers.
The House passed its version in July 1991, but the Senate bill was
withdrawn following a filibuster in June 1992.79
The 1992 effort received considerably less ink than the 1978 reform bill and far less coverage than in 1935 and 1947. News stories
reporting on the bill suggest that unions had difficulty communicating
the depth of the problem and the persuasiveness of labor's proposed
solution. During the 1980s and early 1990s, employers used or threatened to use permanent replacements to defeat numerous high-profile

75. See 124 CONG. REC. S7187 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1978) (reporting ratification by a
68-32 margin for the first treaty); id. at S10,540-41 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 1978) (reporting
ratification by a 68-32 margin for the second treaty).
76. See, e.g., ADAM CLYMER, DRAWING THE LINE AT THE BIG DITCH: THE PANAMA CANAL
TREATIES AND THE RISE OF THE RIGHT 53-69, 180-96 (2008); Martin Tolchin, CongressDemocrats Running Scared, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1980, at B13; John Herbers, Thunder on the
Right Has Turned into an Insistent Rumble, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1978, at E4.
77. Moderate Republicans who voted for the Canal Treaties but against cloture
on labor law reform include Senators Howard H. Baker (Tenn.), Henry Bellmon (Okla.),
John C. Danforth (Mo.), and Samuel I. Hayakawa (Cal.). Conservative Democrats who
supported the Carter Administration on the Canal ratification votes but not labor law
reform include Senators Lloyd Bentsen (Tex.), Dale Bumpers (Ark.), Howard Cannon
(Nev.), Lawton Chiles (Fla.), Ernest Hollings (S.C.), Russell B. Long (La.), and Herman
Talmadge (Ga.). See 124 CONG. REC. 817,568 (daily ed. June 14, 1978) (reporting failure
of cloture by 58-41); id. at S17,749 (daily ed. June 15, 1978) (reporting failure of cloture
by 58-39 on June 15).
78. H.R. 5 (S. 55), 102d Cong. (1992).
79. See U.S. HOUSE OF REPS., CALENDARS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND HISTORY OF LEGISLATION (FINAL ED.) 102D CONG. 8-1, 12-2 (1993) (recounting bill
passed by House July 17, 1991; considered by Senate June 9-16, 1992). The second and
final cloture vote failed by 57-42 on June 16. See 138 CONG. REC. S14,875 (daily ed. June 16,
1992). As chief counsel to the Senate Subcommittee on Labor, I participated in the legislative processes that culminated in the June 1992 filibuster. The bill was taken up in the
103d Congress as well, where it again passed the House but this time the Senate cloture
vote secured only fifty-three votes. See 140 CONG. REc. S16,296 (daily ed. July 13, 1994)
(reporting cloture vote fails 53-46).
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strikes; not surprisingly, this period witnessed a dramatic decline in
the number of strikes. 0 But despite union efforts to explain why the
demise of the strike as a meaningful self-help weapon was undermining wage levels and economic welfare for millions of employees, a number of stories cast doubt on this narrative by presenting replacement
workers in a relatively sympathetic light.
A front-page Wall Street Journalstory followed a forty-eight-yearold man who quit his union job at a different company and crossed a
picket line to become a millwright, and a permanent replacement, during a prolonged strike at International Paper.8 1 Although angry strikers slashed his tires, the replacement worker was unmoved: "I didn't
feel bad-I considered myself lucky... . Unions were needed when they
started, but they've come to a stopping point."82 After invoking national
polls that revealed surprisingly low visibility for the American labor
movement, the reporter observed: "For many workers, crossing a picket
line just doesn't carry the severe stigma it once did. Fewer Americans
have family or friends in unions. And, particularly when unemployment is high, an honest day's work-or any work-can have more appeal than solidarity and brotherhood."83
Another story in a West Virginia paper described the travails of
four anonymous and fearful replacement workers." The story quoted
the four as saying they took the jobs to feed their families, adding "[a]
$14-an-hour job is hard to find."85 The reporter also highlighted the replacement workers' assertions that they had out-produced union workers and "done a safer and more efficient job at the plant."88
To be sure, there were stories and opinion columns, including in
local papers, that developed the policy arguments in favor of banning
permanent replacements. Newspapers reported on the concern that
collective bargaining was severely undermined without an effective
right to strike and that the threat as well as the reality of permanent
replacements was having a chilling impact on the protected rights of
unions and their members.87 Yet on the other side (apart from stories
80. See James J. Brudney, Book Review: To Strike or Not to Strike, 1999 Wis. L.

REv. 65, 80-81 (1999) (citing sources reporting that overall strike activity declined by
more than fifty percent from the 1970s to the 1980s, and major strikes-involving one
thousand workers or more-declined by nearly ninety percent from the 1970s to the mid
1990s).
81. See Dana Milbank, On the Ropes: Unions'Woes Suggest How the Labor Force in
US. Is Shifting, WALL ST. J., May 5, 1992, at Al.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See RAC Replacement Workers Want Support of Company, PARKERSBURo SENTINEL, May 5, 1992, at 1.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Joseph P. Ritz, Loss ofAbility to Strike Ends BargainingProcess:Religions Should Aid Workers' Causes, BuFFALO NEWS, May 1, 1992, at B7; Jeffrey F. Brown,
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about replacement workers trying to make ends meet) some newspapers seemed to view the key policy issue from the standpoint of big
business and big labor more than NLRA purposes or priorities. Thus, a
Washington Post editorial suggested that permanent replacements had
increased at a time when unionized U.S. industries were under heavy
global pressure to reduce labor costs and that it was not necessarily
Congress's job to outlaw this development in order to help restore some
of labor's lost clout.88
In the end, as was the case in 1978, Senate consideration did not
occur until many months after House passage, and a pro-business antiunion minority thwarted the bill by using Senate procedures. 9 But the
presence of fifty-seven Senate votes favoring cloture should not obscure
the fact that an issue of enormous concern to unionized workers never
really grabbed the American public.
II. Possible Lessons for the Future
A. The Special Force of the Filibuster
One obvious difference between legislative success and failure involves the impact of Senate supermajority requirements: the 1978 and
1992 filibusters are part of a dramatic change in overall Senate operations. Since the mid 1970s, when the Senate adopted its two-track
system for handling legislative debate, it has been easier to mount a
filibuster because other floor business can move forward while cloture
proceedings are pursued simultaneously on a separate track.90 Between
1917 and 1971, filibusters were a genuinely rare occurrence, with an
average of just over one cloture motion filed each year.9 ' That average
number has increased exponentially, with nearly twenty cloture motions per year from 1971 to 1993, and forty-two cloture motions per
year from 1993 to 2009.92

Editorial, Striker-Replacement Ban Would Balance Labor Law, PANTAGRAPH (Blooming-

ton, IL), May 8, 1992, at A10.
88. See Editorial,Sidetrackingthe Striker Bill, WASH.

POST,

June 28, 1992, at C6.

89. See Senate Debate Kills Limits on Replacing Striking Workers, WASH. POST,
June 17, 1992, at A9; Clifford Krauss, Senate Won't Ban the Tactic of Replacing Strikers,

N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1992, at A13.
90. See SARAH A. BINDER & STEVEN S. SMITH, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE? FILIBUSTERING
INTHE UNITED STATES SENATE 13-16 (1997); Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Filibuster,49 Stan. L. Rev. 181, 201-05 (1997).
91. See ScoTr LILLY, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FROM DELIBERATION To DYSFUNCTION: IT IS
TIME FOR PROCEDURAL REFORM IN THE U.S. SENATE 8 (2010), http://www.americanprogress.
org/issues/2010/03/filibuster.pdf.
92. See id. at 8-9. I calculated the annual average of 42 for 1993 to 2009 by combining two sets of figures presented in Lilly's article. The number of cloture motions does not
capture the full effect of this culture change; many Senate bills die without reaching the
filibuster stage because Senate scheduling pressures are too great to justify even initiating an effort to secure sixty votes.
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The proliferation of filibusters and the resultant increase in Senate gridlock have triggered numerous calls for reform.9 3 Compelling
filibustering senators to occupy the floor full-time and block all other
business might well disrupt or interfere with these members' ability
to accomplish important tasks, such as interacting with their staff and
with interest groups on other legislative matters, meeting with local
constituents, and raising money for their re-election campaigns. Returning to some form of the one-track system also would render the
process of obstruction reasonably transparent and hence politically
more costly with respect to an impatient or cynical public. And a reversion to old ways would again make filibusters physically taxing and
uncomfortable, presumably one reason they were so rare prior to the
1970s.
Regrettably or not, most congressional observers regard the prospect of major reform in the near future as improbable. Although critics
also have raised intriguing constitutional challenges to the filibuster,94
those challenges too seem unlikely to move forward any time soon. Indeed, it is well understood that representation in the Senate is an "undemocratic" aspect of our Constitution, designed to over-represent less
populous states that are predominantly rural in composition.95 Ruraldominated states tend to have a minimal labor-movement presence,
and their senators are predictably disinclined to support pro-union policy proposals. This structural reality, combined with the virtually unlimited ability of corporations to influence senators under the Court's
campaign finance rulings,96 creates daunting challenges to legislative
movement in the Senate.

93. See Joan Indiana Rigdon, FilibusterReform?, WASH. LAWYER (Sept. 2010), http://

www.dcbar.org/for-lawyers/resources/publications/washingtonIlawyer/september 2010/
filibuster reform.cfm (discussing various reform proposals including one requiring production of 41 votes to continue a filibuster, rather than current practice of having to
produce 60 votes to secure cloture); see also GREGORY KOGER, FILIBUSTERING: A POLITICAL
HISTORY OF OBSTRUCTION IN THE HOUSE AND SENATE 195-98 (2010) (discussing prospects for

reform, focused on identifying realistic options for making the filibuster more costly to
obstructing senators).
94. See, e.g., Thomas Geohegan, Mr. Smith Rewrites the Constitution, N.Y TIMES,

Jan. 11, 2010, at A17 (contending that the Senate's rule-based supermajority requirement is constitutionally suspect for several reasons: (i) it flaunts the Constitution's identification of supermajority requirements for only a few special cases; (ii) it circumvents
the presumption that for closely contested bills the vice president should cast the deciding vote; and (iii) it undermines the constitutionally mandated rule that a majority of
senators will constitute a quorum for doing business).
95. See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: PROMISE AND

PERFORMANCE 159-63 (2d ed. 1972); FRANCES E. LEE & BRUCE I. OPPENHEIMER, SIZING UP
THE SENATE: THE UNEQUAL CONSEQUENCES OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 162, 183-85, 220-28

(1999).
96. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010)
(holding that the First Amendment bars Congress from limiting political speech based
on corporate identity).
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But apart from the difficulty of altering Senate rules and practices,
the significant increase in filibusters is also due to a more ideologically
polarized party structure and the concomitant decline in moderate or
centrist members. This polarization is especially evident in the case
of NLRA reform, an issue on which the business community has been
fiercely united since the late 1970s. In diverse policy areas addressing health care, financial institutions, and unemployment benefits, the
increase in filibusters has often resulted in delayed or modified enactments, but it has not foreclosed all chance of success. Even for policy proposals affecting workplace law, real and threatened filibusters have not
prevented the Senate from approving significant new regulation on employment discrimination, plant closings, or family and medical leave.97
What makes labor law reform unusual is the unrelenting opposition of
a unanimous business community, encompassing large employers and
small firms, manufacturers and service providers, and companies with
liberal as well as conservative reputations on social justice matters.
While unions and their members have prevailed in the Senate since
1970 on bills where "business opposition is divided or less than fully
committed,"98 NLRA reform does not belong in that universe.
The business community's uncompromising stance is not terribly surprising when one considers the shift in power between
unions and management over four decades. A series of labor market
developments-primarily stemming from globalization, advances in technology, and growth in immigration-have produced substantial changes
in how terms and conditions of employment are defined and structured.99
These changes have greatly enhanced management's ability to evade
or defy NLRA requirements and aspirations. Given the direction and
magnitude of the shift, unions and employers are fundamentally at odds
regarding the desirability of NLRA reform. Unions want and probably
need such reform in order to lessen the risk that there will be further
losses in majority representation and collective bargaining, whereas the
employer community seems entirely comfortable with that risk.100
97. See, e.g., Worker Adjustment Retraining and Notification (WARN) Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-09 (2006)); Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified principally in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. (2006)); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-54 (2006)).

98. James Gray Pope, The FirstAmendment, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the
Right to Organize in the Twenty-First Century, 51 RUTGERS L. REv. 941, 945 (1999).
99. See, e.g., THOMAS I. PALLEY, PLENTY OF NOTHING: THE DOWNSIZING OF THE AMERICAN
DREAM AND THE CASE FOR STRUCTURAL KEYNESIANISM 29-30, 156-75 (1998); U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE DUNLOP COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKERMANAGEMENT RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT 1-14 (1994) (DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT).

100. As succinctly expressed by Professor Estlund: "Unions cannot live if they kill
their 'hosts'; they cannot thrive if employers do not. But employers can thrive without
unions; indeed many would prefer to see unions die out altogether, and are willing to do
their part to bring that about." Estlund, supra note 2, at 1543.
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B. Building the Case for Urgency
Although the special role of the filibuster on NLRA matters has
diminished chances for legislative success, Kingdon's model suggests
the central challenge is to render a policy problem sufficiently compelling to justify urgent congressional consideration. In 1935 and 1947,
the pervasive presence of strikes and disruptive worker protests was
essential to establishing the broadly perceived need for an immediate
legislative solution. In 1978 and 1992, that prevailing sense of urgency
never materialized. Indeed, the lack of felt urgency even after House
approval resulted in long delays (as more urgent policy issues took priority on the Senate floor) that effectively facilitated the filibuster efforts of bill opponents.
There is some irony in the fact that widespread resort to strikes
is unlikely to produce such urgency in the future, given the adverse
impact of the permanent replacement weapon on legal protections for
and public attitudes toward strikers. But the union movement has developed other channels for visible and forceful group action, notably
comprehensive campaigns aimed at investors, consumers, regulators,
community groups, and the media. These campaigns, like the strike in
earlier times, may be seen as efforts to generate economic pressure, energize workers at the grassroots level, and educate broader segments
of the public. 01 When directed at employers, the new techniques and
strategies have often proved effective in securing union recognition
and in establishing and enforcing collective bargaining relationships.
Additionally, worker centers, focused on the diverse needs of low-wage
and especially immigrant employees, have succeeded in pressuring employers to modify working conditions and in educating a wider community.102 It seems at least plausible that the new approaches, having
achieved results with employers, can be harnessed to convey to policymakers and the public an urgent need for congressional action.
That brings us to the core question: whether NLRA reform really
is urgently needed. What must the public-as well as policy communities in and around Congress-understand and believe in order to conclude that the Act requires immediate attention? Without delving into

101. See generally JuLIus G. GETMAN, RESTORING THE POWER OF UNIONS: IT TAKES

A MOVEMENT 79-91, 101-14, 120-37 (2010); James J. Brudney, Collateral Conflict: Employer Claims of RICO Extortion Against Union Comprehensive Campaigns, 83 S. CAL.
L. REV. 731, 737-44 (2010); James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check
Recognition: Prospectsfor Changing Paradigms,90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 824-40 (2005).
102. See generally JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE
EDGE OF THE DREAM 48-71, 103-19, 157-79, 249-52 (2006); Jennifer Gordon, Law, Lawyers, and Labor: The United Farm Workers'LegalStrategy in the 1960s and 1970s and the
Role of Law in Union OrganizingToday, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 55-64 (2005); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, the Workplace Project,
and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 407, 428-37 (1995).
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specific reform proposals, I see at least three distinct ways to develop
the case for urgency. I will merely outline them here.
One approach stems from the substantial growth of inequality in
our labor market since the early 1970s and the fact that a sharply
diminished role for unions has accompanied these increasing disparities in wealth. A central premise of the NLRA was that the growth of
collective bargaining would promote a fairer distribution of economic
resources and enhance mass purchasing power. 03 We have endured
several decades of stagnant earnings for nonsupervisory workers and
several years of economic crisis in which consumers have become less
willing and able to spend. The general public, and especially working
families below the top income tier, need a firmer conception of and appreciation for the relationship that collective bargaining can have to
economic fairness and a healthier economy.
A second approach stems from the dwindling sense of community
in the employment setting and the role unions can play in rebuilding
that sense. By providing for employees' voice to be an integral part of
workplace decision making, the NLRA aimed to further the inherently
American concept of democratic self-government.'" Decades later,
"bowling alone" has become a metaphor for the decline in our social in10 Workteraction, political participation, and community orientation.o
ers and policymakers need to become more familiar and comfortable
with how the NLRA can promote workplace values and civic virtues
like solidarity and selflessness. 1 06
A third dimension of the case for urgency stems from the looming
pressure for alternative solutions. Absent meaningful congressional
renewal of the Act, courts will continue to distrust and circumscribe
its core values,'0 7 and the NLRB will continue to function as a largely
isolated and too-often politicized agency.10 In the meantime, unions
and workers will increasingly contract around NLRA standards and
processes and will look more often to state and local government initiatives. 09 American business and its supporters in the policy community
103. See generally James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective BargainingProtections and the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 949-50 (1996) (citing nu-

merous sources).
104. See generally id. at 950 (citing numerous sources).
105. See ROBERT D. PuTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
CoMMUNITY 15-28, 134-44 (2000); THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO MANAGEMENT IN AMERICAN CIc LIFE 171-74, 219-46 (2003).
106. See generally James Gray Pope, Class Conflicts of Law II: Solidarity,Entrepreneurship,and the Deep Agenda of the Obama NLRB, 57 Bure. L. REv. 653, 653-55 (2009).
107. See generally James J. Brudney, Reflections on GroupAction and the Law of
the Workplace, 74 TEx. L. REv. 1563, 1572-88 (1996).
108. See generally James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB's Uncertain Future, 26 Comp. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 221, 227-31, 241-52 (2005).
109. See generally Benjamin I. Sachs, Despite Preemption:Making Labor Law in
Cities and States, 124 HARv. L. REv. 1153 (2011).
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need a clearer understanding of the growing balkanization in labormanagement relations norms and practices, a trend likely to increase
without substantial updating of the federal law that fosters a uniform
national approach.
The legislative reform narratives set forth in this article indicate
that developments in the political climate usually occur independently
of whether a policy problem is perceived as sufficiently salient and urgent to warrant congressional consideration. Yet while extrinsic developments in Supreme Court jurisprudence or American foreign policy
may be difficult to anticipate, they cannot become enabling factors
unless the case for urgency is already in place. Conversely, without
sufficiently broad-based perceptions of a policy problem's immediate
importance, such extrinsic developments can delay and perhaps derail majority-supported legislation. In this context, supporters of the
proposed Employee Free Choice Act have cause for concern. Notwithstanding House approval in 2009, Senate floor consideration was deferred for the remainder of the 111th Congress, in large part because
of protracted attention to the "more urgent" proposal for health care reform. Following the Democrats' loss of their House majority in the 2010
elections, prospects are dim for passage of the Act in the foreseeable
future. Supporters have expended great effort and energy to promote a
stronger public awareness and appreciation for why NLRA reform is so
important, but obviously there remains work to be done.
It may be that the next presidential campaign will feature an extended and educative focus on how to address the acute inequalities
that persist in our economy. It also seems possible that emerging Supreme Court doctrine on federalism and dual sovereignty may further
undermine the NLRA's presumed aspiration for a uniform legal approach. And it is even conceivable that political pressures will result
in some structural adjustment to the vastly overused filibuster procedure. Still, the lesson of past legislative efforts is that socioeconomic
conditions, extrinsic developments in foreign policy or in the courts,
and Senate rules or practices-however important-are not the decisive factors distinguishing success from failure. If labor law reform is
to take place in the future, proponents must generate a more robust
and compelling case for urgency, both within the relevant policymaking
community and in the public imagination.
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